September 22, 2009
Dear Mr. Ford,
First, I would like to say thank you for taking the time to jot down a few of your thoughts. Rather than discuss them point by point in a quid pro quo argumentative sort of way, I do hope that we can facilitate a fruitful discourse via our exchanges. That said, allow me to preface what follows by saying that I am treating your opening gesture of dialogue with the same sincerity I would my own discourses and any apparent sarcasm is the unfortunate by-product of my own communicative failings and/or the medium by which necessity forces us to engage in dialogue of this weighty sort. I would also hope that this exchange can be the beginning of subsequent discussions concerning and arising from our respective discourses.
To begin, then, I want to first acknowledge agreement with your proof as written.1 Such a logical (or, rather, illogical) conceit is certainly detrimental to the implied task. That said, a few questions do arise from your outline and the logical leaps it implies as definitive and absolute.2
Thus, before I attend these specific issues that your logical experiment raises, I should endeavor to apply it and see where such an application leads.3 By way of illustration, please read this passage taken from the travel journals of a prominent4 folklorist:
Being a student of the mythological, I have spent much time reading about the various structural systems of belief found in various cultures throughout history. With this in mind, I would submit to the beliefs of the remote aboriginals of the Lower Woochintau Province of South.5 During time spent in the Lower Woochintau Province of South, I happened to observe one Headman Big Cheese6 who expounded upon me, at great length, I might add, a phenomenon seen there by which liquid precipitated from the sky to the ground in great quantities. Such a phenomenon, Headman Big Cheese insisted, occurred by result of great machines built long ago by the first of the aboriginals in the Lower Woochintau Province of South and subsequently moved to the skies by complex mechanisms of skins sewn together and lifted by large amounts of burning coals.
Unfortunately, the originators of these strange contraptions (being primitive, Headman Big Cheese explained) failed to engineer a mechanism by which to steer their flying craft, resulting in a curious inability to ensure that the aforementioned contraptions could be directed to a single geographical locality at will.7 And yet, a strange corollary to the flying machine’s construction brought about an apparent preparative benefit: from the coals came copious amounts of smoke and steam that heralded the arrival of the precipitation mechanism. Additionally, in quite a few instances, the roar of the machinery as it crushed great blocks of ice into small enough pieces for the coals to melt and sprinkle over the land could be quite boisterous.8 Thus, the farmers and herdsmen were typically well warned of the impending deluge.
Naturally, this fellow laughed at my decidedly unscientific attempt at explaining the concept of meteorological patterns, since he had both a body of evidence9 whereas I had only my cacamamie theory of “rain” and “clouds.”10 And so we retired to his hut to wine and dine.
Obviously, this farcical fabrication would elicit a rather sardonic smile from any true explorer hearing about flying, rain-making machines. However, I would point out that the fictional aboriginal’s argument for the source of rain to be supported by (in his mind) a significant amount of evidence and explanation. And yet, no modern scientist would give second thought the possibility of such a possibility.
Why? Perhaps because it fails to satisfy the requirements of empirical study upon which post-Enlightenment Western culture has bet the farm for the last few centuries. And yet, the aboriginal would surely argue that his own scientific methods to be legitimate and the foreigner to be in the wrong. Again, why? Perhaps the simplest answer: the fictional aboriginal would not agree to apply the Western scientific method. More on this in a moment.
By way of discursive example, how is it that a $20 bill of United States legal tender differs from a $5 bill of the same? There is no significant difference in their composition.11 Perhaps then it is the faces printed upon them that alters their valuation. This does not seem to follow sound logic–after all, President Jackson committed several rather unconscionable governmental land-grabs from a specific people group whereas President Lincoln secured (and died for) the emancipation of an entire people group.
We can play at the game of “perhaps” ad nauseam. The ultimate reason, we learned long ago as children even if we did not understand, is that the Federal government of the United States has determined that the valuations of these bills to be set at their respective amounts. However, even this declaration is inherently meaningless. A $20 note is worth a rather variable amount based upon the item being offered in trade. Thus, any “innate” value would be wholly irrelevant; it is predicated upon the agreement of the people using the currency that creates value.13 Consider: most would agree that the value of a 14k gold wedding band is greater than that of a chocolate muffin, such a value only remains in effect so long as the majority populace remains in agreement. Ergo, the starving man or the man recently divorced might both place higher value upon the muffin to the point that each would trade his gold ring for said muffin. Value, then, is complicit with agreement. If I believe something to be worth more than you are willing to pay, a sale will not occur baring an outside force creating a sense of necessity.14 15
So also matters of language. I might willfully speak of “conjuctifying the retriflicator” ad nauseam, but unless the person to whom I am speaking agrees that this jibberish has meaning, I will appear either insane or eccentric.16 This principle is the driving force behind the evolution of language and communication, and why we no longer speak Latin or how the Travelers’ cant has meaning to their cultural subgroup.
The point of this tangent is to reaffirm the agreements that are necessary for a culture and society–not just to function–but to exist. Second to this, then, must also come acceptance, however, reluctant, that these agreements are rather arbitrary in fact. There is no transcendental signifier to be found.17 Every social system we adhere to is, for all intents and purposes, relative to our culture and experience, with some systems being more functionally useful than others.
Now, returning to the proof and implications at hand, one can argue at length the benefits and shortfalls of an empirical method,18 however one should also consider the ultimate source of such a model. Whereby do we arrive at an empirical standard? By inductive19 reasoning and a variant of the social contract20–that is, through repetitive experience and tacit agreement with a predetermined set of boundaries limiting the extent and methods of acquiring experience.21 Granted, we use rather expansive and inclusive pool of experiences in our experimentation and formulations and can have what most would consider a reasonable certainty about most things; we might even reach a point whereupon we can offer explanations of phenomena with confidence. But these are dependent upon a stable system of expression (not unlike language, in many ways) that is limited by predetermined parameters of acceptance.22
In order for such a system to work, however, something must be done to in some way counter the potentially erratic outcomes of a wholly experiential system. After all, the inductive method is inherently predicated upon a potentially disastrous logical foundation.23 The logical workaround is to devise a system that utilizes the overall schema of an inductive system, yet somehow manages to avoid its flaws. From this need arises the largely mythical notion of objectivity.24 I would argue objectivity as innately impossible. To divorce experiencer from experience is to create pseudo-experiences, which are not really experiences at all since there is no one to experience the experience.25 Worded differently, does the act of pseudo-experience26 affect the outcome of the experience in question?27
Deduction does not occur ex nihilo. Even Descartes chose a starting foundation, and he so famously began with “I think.”28 But thinking is no more an indicator of existence. Computers think via software and programming, yet they have not yet achieved self-awareness.29 No matter where Descartes chooses to begin, he encounters the same circular reasoning.31 To paraphrase Derrida, language and, by extension we could say experience, has no innate transcendence.32 Our struggle, then, is that we have tried to build a deductive approach atop an inductive foundation.33
The presence of evidence and explanation, understandable or otherwise, is not tantamount to any larger claim of “truth” or “actuality of being.”34 As demonstrated in the aforementioned issue of the aboriginal, he himself had evidence and understood how his theory of rain-production explained the presence of rain, yet this explanation did not conform to the nature of reality.35 Merely because a theory has evidence and an explanation in no way makes said theory correct, but rather evidence and explanation allow for a theory to become one possibility on any given day that might just as easily be disproved two days later as more evidence and “better”36 explanations arrive.37
The trouble is that, in the case of an empirical system, it has been arbitrarily and artificially created38 and within that system certain options for causes must also conform to the experiences of the collective39 in order for the system to continue to function.40 Should a member of the collective introduce an explanation that does not conform to the agreed upon standards and practices of the collective, he or she would summarily be outcast regardless as to the validity of their explanation.41
Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the scientific methods we have used are not beneficial in any way, nor am I proposing a “better” system. I merely seek to point out that the system only works, not because of some innate “truth”, but because everyone agrees that it works within the frame and boundaries of what is collectively accepted.42 We are, at our core, inherently experiential beings43 existing a world of experience seeking to make deductive judgements based upon inductive presuppositions. The major difference lies in the presupposition from which we begin.
To borrow language from your outline, we have Person A and Person B44 and Theory A and Theory B.45 pA holds to tA as evidenced and reasonable;46 pB holds to tB as, likewise, evidenced and reasonable.47 Both bA and bB are different and may or may not be mutually exclusive in concept, though bA certainly excludes bB. pA, then, does not hold as valid bB,48 therefore pA inexorably finds tB false. Similarly, pB does not hold as valid bA,49 thus pB finds tA false. Who, then, is correct if both decree the other is incorrect and anathema and will not accept the evidence and/or explanation offered by the other? Naturally, the one with the larger army is correct–regardless of any actuality of being regarding tA or tB.50
A story told by the late David Foster Wallace comes to mind:
There are these two guys sitting together in a bar in the remote Alaskan wilderness. One of the guys is religious, the other is an atheist, and the two are arguing about the existence of God with that special intensity that comes after about the fourth beer.
And the atheist says: “Look, it’s not like I don’t have actual reasons for not believing in God. It’s not like I haven’t ever experimented with the whole God and prayer thing. Just last month I got caught away from the camp in that terrible blizzard, and I was totally lost and I couldn’t see a thing, and it was fifty below, so I tried it: I fell to my knees in the snow and cried out ‘Oh, God, if there is a God, I’m lost in this blizzard, and I’m gonna die if you don’t help me.’”
And now, in the bar, the religious guy looks at the atheist all puzzled. “Well then you must believe now,” he says, “after all, here you are, alive.”
The atheist just rolls his eyes. “No, man, all that was was a couple Eskimos happened to come wandering by and showed me the way back to camp.”51
This anecdotal story illustrates the prime point. One man has chosen for his bA52 a naturalistic system. Thus he does not look for evidence of a theistic hand or even a theistic explanation since it does not fit within his predetermined framework for explaining the world. As a result, he does not find evidence for a theistic possibility, leading him to further conclude that theistic evidence neither exists nor is necessary to exist. The other man, conversely, has chosen53 theism and thusly sees a divine hand amidst natural phenomena. Both men have compelling evidence from their own points of view, and each would argue against the evidence of the other.
Ah, but someone says, but if we apply empiricism and a few slices with Ockam’s razor–we can clearly see that the world does not need a theistic explanation. And he might very well be correct; but such a person also sees theism as unnecessary precisely because he has begun with the presupposition that there must be an answer that does not necessitate a theistic explanation. He finds a natural explanation to support his predetermined naturalistic outcome. And, since the majority of his fellows would agree, he would continue on from that beginning point and, based on the principles of induction, find experiences that fulfill the worldview he has, consciously or unconsciously, chosen. As intimated previously, an inch is only an inch because everyone agrees on what an inch is and how it functions, and the difference between an inch and a squirrel, or a noodle, or piece of rubber, etc.54
Of course, this lengthy discourse is predicated upon a few possible assumptions:
1.) Either truth and actuality do not “exist” and are wholly relative constructions of societal and scientific discourse;55
2.) Truth and actuality exist innately, but we cannot ever know them;56
3.) Truth and actuality exist innately and we can know them via discovery;57
4.) Truth and actuality exist innately, and we can know them if they are shown to us by one who already knows them.58
Our worldview is predicated upon which assumption on which we choose to base our deductive-induction.
As I said previously, I hope your outline and this response to be but the opening movements of a larger symphony of mutually beneficial discourse and dialogue and look forward to continuing this discussion.
Sincerely,
F.
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1 Reprinted for referential convenience:
“The Illogic of Default [sic]
1. We have theory A & Theory B
2. Theory A is supported by loads of evidence
3. Theory B is supported by no evidence at all.
4. I understand how Theory A explains x.
5. Therefore Theory B must be right!
(This ignores the question of whether Theory B can explain x, and ignores the fact that Theory B has no positive evidence in its favour [sic] anyway).”back
2 Such confusions could likely be resultant from notes hastily written due to the matter of prior obligations and required travel times in metro Atlanta.back
3 Please refer to my remarks in the opening paragraph: this discourse is intended to be a (hopefully) dryly humorous opening remark for what I hope will prove to be a larger and neither a straw man critique nor a tacit attempt to brush aside legitimate observation and argumentation. Please accept it at face value until such a time as my larger, rhetorical aim can be made explicit. back
4 And wholly fictitious and rhetoricalback
5 A fictional tribe of fictitious origin presented here for illustrative purposes.back
6 Son of former Headman Little Cheese Big Stinkback
7 Subsequent engineers would later construct more elaborate mechanisms high atop Mt. Woochintau Jr. that produced gales sufficiently strong enough to direct the former contraption, but I digress.back
8 Many a small child, he noted, became frightened at the sound or the sparks that flashed from time to timeback
9 Collected over the many years dating all the way back to his Great12-Grandsire, one Headman Small Cheese (Big Nose)back
10 When pressed for an teleological explanation as to where said machines acquired the requisite amount of ice, he assured me that their current engineers were already at work building another flying machine to visit and study the first.back
11 As opposed to the differences between a bill woven from recycled paper and one printed on leather might demonstrate.12 back
12 It has been pointed out to me that there is apparently a slight difference in size.back
13 Given rise to the separate notions of “official currency” and “de facto currency”; c.f Confederate currency was deemed utterly worthless in favor of its northern counterpart by the end of the U.S. Civil War, even within the C.S.A.back
14 i.e. scarcity of item being offered, sudden need for cash, etc.back
15 This would also be why eBay and Craigslist have become thriving economic centersback
16 This being wholly determined by my level of fame and/or fortune as compared to the person to whom I am jibber-jabbering. Or to quote an old friend, one Daniel W. Geetar: “…if you fall short of genius, you are just a weirdo.” Incidentally, Mrs. The Wife has expressed reservations re: the possibility that she might, one day, be referred to as the “eccentric psycho’s wife.” back
17 c.f. Derridaback
18 And, in the interest of full disclosure, I would much prefer my doctor, financier, lawyer, and so forth to adhere to empirical theory and principles!back
19 i.e. experientialback
20 For the sake of brevity, I will not digress so far as to debate the abstractions of number theory and the like, however please bracket them out as well for purpose of our conversation.back
21 Or, to quote a math educator and friend, “Show your work [used to solve the problems]. Magic is not an acceptable option.”back
22 c.f. note 21back
23 c.f. the classic “all swans I’ve seen are white, e.g. all swans must be white” logically fallacyback
24 At its most basic form, objective induction attempts to separate experience from experiencer; in short, this creates the dilemma of the Observer Effect (in layman’s terms, think trees falling sans witnesses).back
25 c.f. note 24back
26 that is, observing an experience from an outside (re: objective) perspectiveback
27 Since Schroedinger’s cat is still dead-alive-alive-dead in that box of his, I will refrain from rehashing butchering his eloquent argument in this discussion.back
28 a statement predicated upon first having some conceptualization of self (I) and what it means for self to engage in thought. Sans either element, we have a deductively refutational circle: I think, therefore I am. But wait, if I exist because I think, from whence or whom arises the thoughts that provide evidence of my existence? The answer must be I. Hmmm…Perhaps I am, therefore I think? No, no, that can’t be right. What proves that I, in fact, am in order to think in the first place? Well, I think, so…etc. and so forthback
29 For which we should all be thankful since War Games, The Terminator, The Matrix, 2001: A Space Odyssey, Blade Runner, Alien, iRobot, Metropolis, et. al. have demonstrated the perils and tribulations and genocides that arise when computers achieve or are granted a degree of self-awareness30 (this list, of course, is merely a survey and not exhaustive and does not include literary works, comic books, or video games).back
30 re: note 29–the potential disaster awaiting humanity should our computer overlords realize the degree of control they have upon our lives contributes largely to my fearful pessimism concerning cloud computing, traffic cameras, automated teller machines, programmable coffee makers, and Google.back
31 “I sit beside the fire, therefore I am” leads to the same dilemma as his stated proposition.back
32 Reducing down our systems to their most basic form, we find mathematics; c.f. note 21back
33 Our coping method, then, being the boundaries and limitations we impose upon our deductive-induction so as to keep our reasoning from circling around and around ad infinitum.back
34 i.e. there is no “innate value” in a $20 bill, only that which is imparted to an otherwise unremarkable and ugly piece of fabric; we might also say that neither an inch nor a centimeter has any innate “distance” apart from what the scientific academies have agreed constitutes such and, moreover, we only recognize a distinction between the two terms based upon the differences that arise when the inch is viewed alongside the centimeter; for further reading, c.f. Derrida, Of Grammatology, “Différance”back
35 Itself a highly subjective term whose definition depends upon a number of factors to be discussed in the paragraphs followingback
36 Better, of course, being subjective and limited to the aforementioned boundaries of discovery; is it “better” for me to hold to Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, Stephen Hawking’s elusive “Theory of Everything” (the answer to which, naturally, is 42 [c.f. Adams]), or to a belief that the planet, despite spheroid tendencies, is really a disc on the backs of four elephants riding atop an infinite column of giant, intergalactic turtles flying through space?back
37 This sort of thinking is what most people would agree constitutes the overall schema of scientific “discovery” and “progress”back
38 Again, the fruits of empiricism have been greatly beneficial (c.f note 18); nevertheless the point remains that empiricism, in and of itself, is an arbitrary construction upon which the Western world has built their logic and scientific approachesback
39 c.f. Hume, Popper, Millerback
40 Again, “Magic is not an option.”back
41 c.f. Galileoback
42 c.f. note 40back
43 since, at least on a fundamental level, everything we do derives from and leads to inductive reasoning; c.f. Everything and More: a Compact History of Infinity by David Foster Wallace for a humorous and concise treatise on inductionback
44 henceforth pA and pB, respectivelyback
45 henceforth tA and tB, respectivelyback
46 based upon the boundaries within which pA has determined tA must work in order to be valid (henceforth bA).back
47 based upon the boundaries within which pB has determined tB must work in order to be valid (henceforth bB).back
48 owing to the non-comformative relationship of bB to bAback
49 owing to the non-comformative relationship of bA to bBback
50 This being the “history written by victor” theorem.back
51 excerpted from “This is Water,” David Foster Wallaceback
52 Consciously or unconsciouslyback
53 Ibid.back
54 c.f. Derrida, “Différance”back
55 whereby everything “exists” because of some collective “groupthink” whereby we all agree that we actually exist until such a time as we no longer agree on what existence is; Descartes’ ultimate dilemma and also the foundation upon which I can argue that all of existence is really an elaborate illusion created by my mind, so detailed right down to another person’s counter-argument that they, too, in fact, exist independent of my imagination. c.f. The Matrix, “What is real?”back
56 whereby any such attempt to know the unknowable becomes ultimately futile leading us to possible assumption 1.) via the roundabout way; c.f. note 55back
57 but we must then agree what constitutes as “truth” and “actuality” so as to recognize them for what they are when we discover them, whereby any such attempt at consensus returns us to possible assumption 1.) via 2.); c.f. notes 56, then 55back
58 whereby we have a standard of truth that can be known and a state of actuality that can be measuredback
